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Abstract 
 
This paper is one of the first to estimate how the region in which an establishment is located affects 
its productivity, wage cost and cost competitiveness (i.e. its productivity-wage gap). To do so, we 
use detailed linked employer-employee panel data for Belgium and rely on methodological 
approaches from both Hellerstein and Neumark (1995) and Bartolucci (2014) to estimate dynamic 
panel data models at the establishment level. Our findings show that inter-regional differences in 
productivity and wages are significant but vanish almost totally, both in industry and services, when 
controlling for a wide range of covariates, establishment fixed effects and endogeneity. Thus, our 
results suggest that wage cost and productivity differentials are ceteris paribus relatively well 
aligned across regions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to competitive labour market theory, wage differences across workers reflect only 
variation in individual ability and/or differences in working conditions (Mortensen, 2003; 
Rosen, 1974). This simple description of the wage-setting system is, however, challenged by 
numerous alternative explanations. For instance, non-competitive models of wage 
determination, including collective bargaining, rent-sharing, discrimination or monopsony, 
find some support in the empirical literature (Baert et al., 2015; Cahuc et al., 2014; 
Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2015; Manning, 2011; McGuinness et al., 2010; Russo and 
Hassink, 2012). Hence, equally productive workers with similar working conditions do not 
always receive the same wages. Put differently, there might be some misalignment between 
productivity and wages.  
Recent studies have shown that these productivity-wage gaps may discourage firms from 
employing specific categories of workers, such as the lower educated or older ones (Cardoso 
et al., 2011; Cataldi et al., 2011, 2012; Hellerstein and Neumark, 2004; Ilmakunnas and 
Maliranta, 2005; Lebedinski and Vandenberghe, 2014; Pfeifer and Wagner, 2012; Rycx et al., 
2015; Saks, 2014; Vandenberghe, 2011, 2013). It is also often emphasized that productivity-
wage gaps may be at the root of large and persistent differences in unemployment rates across 
regions (Dejemeppe and Van der Linden, 2006; Konings and Marcolin, 2014; Martin et al., 
2011; Pereira and Galego, 2014; Rusinek and Tojerow, 2014; Simon et al., 2006). The 
standard argument is that wage-setting mechanisms may not be flexible enough to account for 
the diversity of productivity patterns across regions. This would create regional productivity-
wage gaps and lead to the destruction of employment in regions where productivity is lagging 
behind. Yet, the accurateness of this explanation is still highly controversial (Elhorst, 2003; 
Zeilstra and Elhorst, 2014). This is due to the fact that the relationship between regions, wage 
costs and productivity is still not well understood. In particular, it remains unclear whether 
wage cost and productivity differentials are well aligned across regions.  
Belgium is an interesting case study to test for the presence of regional productivity-wage 
gaps. Differences in labour market performance across Belgian regions are substantial and 
long-lasting. Figures for 2014 show for instance that the unemployment rate is equal to 5% in 
Flanders, 12% in Wallonia and 18% in Brussels. As regards the employment rate, it reaches 
54% in Brussels, 57% in Wallonia and 66% in Flanders (Eurostat, 2016). Moreover, Belgium 
is characterised by a relatively centralised and coordinated wage-setting process. As in many 
European countries, collective bargaining is conducted at three levels (i.e. national, industry 
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and firm). It is hierarchical and structured such that an agreement concluded at one level 
cannot be less favourable than agreements reached at an upper level. The heart of wage 
bargaining lies at the sectoral level.1 However, 25 to 30% of private sector workers see their 
working conditions collectively re-negotiated at the firm level (du Caju et al., 2012; Lopez 
and Sissoko, 2013). Additionally, Belgium is characterized by a coverage rate of more than 
90% (OECD, 2012). This stems from the fact that non-unionized workers, like employers 
who are not members of an employers’ organization, are generally covered by a collective 
labour agreement.2 Overall, Belgium appears to be a typical example of a European country 
for which it could be argued that its wage-setting system is too rigid to account satisfactorily 
for regional productivity shocks and that regional unemployment differentials are fostered by 
this rigidity (OECD, 2013).  
Yet, the validity of this hypothesis remains to be demonstrated. Indeed, micro-
econometric evidence regarding the potential misalignment of wages to regional productivity 
differentials in advanced economies is rare and very inconclusive (Dejemeppe and Van der 
Linden, 2006; Konings and Marcolin, 2014; Pereira and Galego, 2014; Rusinek and Tojerow, 
2014; Simon et al., 2006). Moreover, findings must often be interpreted with caution because 
of methodological and/or data limitations.  Last  be not least,  very little is  known on whether 
the region-productivity-wage nexus is influenced by specific work environments. This is 
problematic as the latter is likely to depend on the characteristics of the production unit, for 
instance the economic activity of the firm. 
Our paper aims to unravel productivity-wage gaps from a regional perspective. More 
precisely, we examine how the region in which an establishment is located affects its 
productivity, wage cost and cost competitiveness (i.e. its productivity-wage gap). We also 
investigate whether the region-productivity-wage nexus varies across work environments 
defined by the sectoral affiliation of the establishments. To do so, we use detailed Belgian 
linked employer-employee panel data for the years 1999-2010. These data offer several 
advantages. The panel covers a large part of the private sector, provides accurate information 
on average productivity and wages within establishments and allows us to control for a wide 
range of worker, job and establishment characteristics. It also enables us to address important 
                                                             
1 There is scope for industry agreements to be set at the regional level. However, in practice this is not common. 
2 Two additional mechanisms regulate the system as a whole: automatic indexation and the ‘wage norm’. The 
indexation mechanism implies that all gross wages automatically rise with consumer prices, i.e. the so-called 
‘health index’. In practice, it imposes a wage floor for wage increases. Since 1996, the so-called ‘wage norm’ 
complements the automatic indexation system. Fixed by the social partners, the norm sets an overall maximum 
margin for labour cost increases for a two-year period. It is based on the weighted average of the expected labour 
cost increases in Belgium’s three main neighbouring countries: Germany, the Netherlands and France. 
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econometric issues that are generally not accounted for in this literature (such as 
establishment-level fixed effects, endogeneity and state dependence).  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. A review of the literature is 
presented in the next section. Sections 3 and 4 respectively describe our methodology and 
data set. The impact of regions on productivity, wages and productivity-wage gaps across 
work environments is analysed in section 5. The last section discusses the results and 
concludes. 
 
2. Background 
 
Many papers estimate wage differentials between regions (some in relation to local 
specificities such as product market competition), but very few directly test whether these 
differentials are aligned with regional productivity differences.3 
The traditional approach, in this literature, boils down to estimate Mincer (1974) type 
wage equations and to decompose inter-regional wage differentials, using e.g. the Oaxaca-
Blinder technique (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973), so as to get a better understanding of their 
magnitude and causes. Empirical results vary across countries. Blackaby and Murphy (1995), 
for instance, investigated wages differentials between the north and south of Britain. The 
authors  were  able  to  control  for  many covariates.  However,  as  in  most  studies,  they  had  no  
direct information on productivity and hence couldn’t directly test for regional productivity-
wage gaps. Nevertheless, their results show that the wage gap between northern and southern 
regions in Britain is largely due to compositional effects (such as regional differences in 
human capital, occupations and industries). They also highlight that the gap that can be 
explained by differences in returns to workers with the same level of skills stands at 2,4% in 
favour of the south, an outcome that is ‘not too far from the neoclassical equilibrium’ (Pereira 
                                                             
3 Another strand of the literature, indirectly related to our topic, focuses on wage curves, i.e. on the elasticity of 
individual wages to regional unemployment rates. Ammermüller et al. (2010), for instance, adopt this strategy to 
investigate the functioning of regional labour markets in Germany and Italy. Their findings show a steeper wage 
curve in Germany than in Italy, for (German) females and for people in the middle of the wage distribution. 
According to Lucifora and Origo (1999), the ‘flatness’ of the Italian wage curve could be explained by the 
collective bargaining structure (which may limit the scope for wage differentiation at the local level) and/or the 
large size of the informal economy (which may imply that adjustments occur outside the regular economy). In 
similar vein, Brunello et al. (2001) report that wage setting in Italy is mainly influenced by economic conditions 
in the north and centre of the country, i.e. in the leading economic areas. Evidence regarding the Belgian wage 
curve is notably provided by Janssens and Konings (1998). Using household data for the years 1985, 1988 and 
1992, they show that the elasticity of wages to regional unemployment stands at around -0.1 for men (a figure 
equivalent to that estimated for the Anglo-Saxon countries (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) and slightly bigger 
in absolute terms than for Germany (Blien et al., 2013)) and is not significantly different from zero for women. 
Accordingly, the authors conclude that unions do take local unemployment rates into account while bargaining 
over wages (especially for men) and that the labour market seems to be more competitive for women. 
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and Galego, 2014: 1531). In a more recent paper concerning the UK, Monastiriotis (2002) 
also found that inter-regional wage differentials are small controlling for standard covariates. 
His decomposition exercise, based on Juhn et al. (1993), highlights that regions account on 
average for less than 2% of overall wage inequality. In addition, he shows that inter-regional 
differences in wage distributions are essentially explained by differences in the occupational 
composition of the workforce and in the returns to occupations. 
Spanish wage differentials appear to be more pronounced ceteris paribus than in the UK 
(Simon and Russell, 2004). Moreover, differences in both characteristics and in their returns 
are found to play an important role in their explanation (Garcia and Molina, 2002). Simon et 
al. (2006) further suggest that regional wage differentials in Spain are related to non-
competitive factors, such as product market competition and collective bargaining institutions. 
In similar vein, Bande et al. (2008) conclude, on the basis of industry-level wage regressions 
run for different groups of regions, that Spanish earnings differences do not seem to reflect 
local conditions fully. They attribute this outcome to a phenomenon of inter-regional wage 
imitation within industries.  
Görzig et al. (2005) examined the situation in Germany. Their results show that regional 
wage differences are particularly marked between the western and eastern parts of the 
country. Moreover, using Nopo’s (2008) non-parametric decomposition technique, they found 
that the east-west wage gap is essentially driven by the shift of the East German economic 
structure towards low-paying types of companies. In contrast, the role of collective bargaining 
characteristics (i.e. a lower bargaining coverage and a more intensive use of opt-out clauses in 
East German establishments) appears to be more limited. Pereira and Galego (2012) applied 
Machado and Mata’s (2005) quantile-based decomposition technique to Portuguese data. 
Their results show that wage differences across regions (both conditional and unconditional) 
increase almost linearly over the wage distribution. This implies that policies reducing inter-
regional inequalities in human capital are likely to be more efficient in eliminating inter-
regional  wage  gaps  at  the  bottom than  at  the  top  of  the  earnings’  distribution.  Price  effects  
(i.e. regional differences in returns for workers with the same level of skills) are indeed found 
to become larger as wages increase.  
Evidence regarding inter-regional wage differentials in Belgium is notably reported in 
Plasman et al. (2007). The latter estimate wage regressions with micro-data including a large 
set of covariates. Their results, for the years 1995, 1999 and 2002, show that hourly wages are 
highest in Brussels, intermediate in Flanders and lowest in Wallonia. However, conditional 
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wage differences across regions are found to be modest and to fluctuate between 0 and 4 
percent depending on the period under investigation. 
Konings and Marcolin (2014) brought the analysis a step further. They used Belfirst data 
from 2005 to 2012 to investigate the presence of regional productivity-wage gaps in the 
Belgian private sector. Taking Flanders as a benchmark, their estimates (in level) indicate that 
wage costs are ‘too high’ with respect to productivity in Wallonia and Brussels. Their findings 
also suggest that a catching up process is going on and that firms’ financial incentives to 
locate in Flanders are actually not that large (especially compared to Brussels) when outcome 
variables are expressed in growth rates. This said, their results should to be taken with caution 
as they are likely to suffer from an omitted variable bias. Indeed, their firm-level regressions 
essentially control for industry, firm size and age, capital stock and year dummies. Many 
important determinants of productivity and wages (such as the composition of the workforce 
in terms of human capital and other demographics) are thus omitted. Moreover, core findings 
do not control for potential time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity.  
The moderating role of the collective bargaining structure in the relationship between 
regional wage and productivity differentials has been investigated by Rusinek and Tojerow 
(2014). Using Belgian linked employer-employee data for the year 2003, they find that the 
more an industry is decentralized in terms of wage setting, the more regional differences in 
productivity are reflected in wages. The authors conclude that the Belgian wage-setting 
system already contains a mechanism (i.e. the possibility to bargain wages at the firm level) 
that allows wages to reflect local specificities. Yet, their results are limited by the fact that 
they rely on data for a single year. 
In sum, micro-econometric evidence regarding the potential misalignment of wages to 
regional productivity differentials in advanced economies is scarce, subject to econometric 
biases and ambiguous. The objective of this paper is to improve our understanding of this key 
issue taking advantage of access to linked employer-employee panel data (with direct 
information on establishment-level productivity and wage costs alongside many covariates) 
and following both the methodological approaches developed by Hellerstein and Neumark 
(1995) and Bartolucci (2014). 
 
3. Methodology 
 
Our baseline empirical approach is based on the separate estimation of a value added function 
and a wage cost equation at the establishment level. The former provides parameter estimates 
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for productivity differentials across regions, while the latter estimates the relative impact of 
each region on the wage bill paid by the establishment. Given that both equations are 
estimated on the same sample with identical control variables, the parameters for marginal 
products and wage costs can be compared and conclusions can be drawn on the existence and 
magnitude of regional productivity-wage gaps. This technique was pioneered by Hellerstein 
and Neumark (1995) and refined/applied by Hellerstein et al. (1999), Hellerstein and 
Neumark (2004), Cardoso et al. (2011), van Ours and Stoeldraijer (2011), Vandenberghe 
(2013), Garnero et al. (2014a,b) and Devicienti et al. (2015) among others. 
The estimated establishment-level productivity and wage cost equations are the 
following4: 
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The dependent variable in equation (1) is establishment i’s hourly value added, obtained by 
dividing the total value added (at factor costs) of the establishment i in period t by the total 
number of working hours (taking into account overtime hours) that have been declared for the 
same period. The dependent variable in equation (2) is the establishment i’s hourly wage cost 
(including fixed and variable pay components, in kind benefits, employer-funded extra-legal 
advantages related e.g. to health, early retirement or pension, and payroll taxes net of social 
security payroll tax cuts). It is obtained by dividing the establishment’s total wage bill by the 
total number of work hours. Hence, the dependent variables in the estimated equations are 
establishment averages of value added and wage cost on an hourly basis. 
                                                             
4 As shown by van Ours and Stoeldraijer (2011), equation (1) can be derived from a standard Cobb-Douglas 
production function augmented to include firm-specific characteristics (notably the region in which an 
establishment is located). It relies on the assumption that substitution elasticities are equal to one and that 
establishments operate at the efficiency frontier. This restriction is standard in the corresponding literature and 
appears to be unproblematic as previous firm-level studies have shown that productivity coefficients obtained 
with a Cobb-Douglas production function are robust to alternative functional specifications (see e.g. Hellerstein 
and Neumark, 2004). Equation (2) is the establishment-level equivalent of a standard wage equation estimated 
with worker data. Individual and job characteristics generally accounted for in worker-level regressions show up 
as shares of the corresponding characteristics at the establishment level and establishment-level characteristics, 
such as the region, enter the equation untransformed (Cardoso et al., 2011). As noted by Haegeland and Klette 
(1999), equations (1) and (2) can be interpreted in a simple descriptive way with no behavioural content. Both 
relate average productivity and wage costs to establishment-level characteristics and the composition of the 
labour force within the latter. 
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The main independent variables, Regionj,i,t, are dummies identifying the region j in which 
the establishment i is located at time t. Establishments are split in three regions (i.e. Brussels, 
Flanders and Wallonia) according to the NUTS one-digit nomenclature. Flanders is the 
reference category. In addition to regional dummies, equations (1) and (2) also include the 
vector Xi,t. It contains a large set of variables controlling for worker, job and establishment 
characteristics. More precisely, it includes the share of the workforce within an establishment 
that: (i) has at most higher secondary education and tertiary education, respectively5, (ii) has 
at least 10 years of tenure, (ii) is younger than 30 and older than 49 years, respectively, (iii) is 
female, (iv) works part-time, (v) occupies blue-collar jobs, (vi) has a fixed term contract, and 
(vi) is apprentice or under contract with a temporary employment agency. Xi,t also comprises 
the log of establishment size (i.e. the number of full-time equivalent workers), the log of 
capital stock per worker6, the level of collective wage bargaining (1 dummy), the sectoral 
affiliation (8 dummies), and 11 year dummies.7 
Estimating equations (1) and (2) allows gauging the effects of regions on establishment 
productivity  and  wage  costs,  but  it  does  not  allow  to  test  directly  whether  the  difference  
                                                             
5 The share of workers with at most lower secondary education serves as reference category. 
6 It has been estimated through the ‘perpetual inventory method’ (or PIM). The intuition of this method is as 
follows (Berlemann and Wesselhöft, 2014; OECD, 2009). The net capital stock at time t (Kt) can be written as 
a function of the net capital stock in the previous period (Kt-1), gross investment (It-1) and consumption of fixed 
capital (Dt-1): Kt = Kt-1 +  It-1 –  Dt-1. Assuming geometric depreciation at a constant rate D, we can re-write 
capital stock as: Kt =  (1-D)  Kt-1 + It-1. Or, alternatively, it can be shown that: 
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t
t
IK 1 . This expression shows that the value of capital stock in t-1 can be estimated by dividing 
investments at time t by the sum of the long term growth rate of nominal GDP and the capital depreciation rate. 
Following standard practice, we assumed a 5 percent annual rate of depreciation for capital and fixed the value 
of T at 4 percent. Data on investments have been taken from the SBS. More precisely, we subtracted sales of 
tangible goods from gross investments in tangible goods at the establishment level. These variables are 
expressed on a per capita basis. As highlighted in footnote 5, equation (1) is derived from a Cobb-Douglas 
production function with labour input in hours worked. Ideally, capital stock should thus also be included on an 
hourly basis. For confidentiality issues, we could only have access to information on investments (and thus on 
capital stock) per worker. Yet, this limitation should be at least partially accounted for by the fact that the share 
of part-timers at the establishment-level is included among the covariates (see footnote 8). 
7 All independent variables are measured in terms of shares in total work hours. For instance, the fraction of 
part-time workers is computed on the basis of the proportion of hours worked by employees working less than 
30 hours per week over the total amount of hours worked within the establishment. The control variables that 
have been included in our regressions are in line with existent literature (for a review of the set of covariates 
that should be included in this type of analysis see e.g. Göbel and Zwick, 2009). As highlighted by Mahlmberg 
et al. (2013: 10): ‘by including a rather broad set of independent variables, we account for heterogeneity among 
firms, in order to mitigate the bias that could be caused by omitted variables’. 
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between the value added and wage cost coefficients for a given region is statistically 
significant.  A simple  method to  obtain  a  test  for  the  significance  of  productivity-wage  gaps  
has been proposed by van Ours and Stoeldraijer (2011). This method boils down to estimating 
equation (3): 
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in which the gap between establishment i’s log hourly value added and log hourly wage costs 
(i.e. the log of the ratio between value added and wage costs) is regressed on the same set of 
explanatory variables as in equations (1) and (2). This produces coefficients for the regional 
dummies and directly measures the size and significance of their respective productivity-wage 
gaps. The dependent variable in equation (3) measures how much value added an 
establishment  produces  per  hourly  wage  cost.  It  is  often  used  as  a  measure  of  cost  
competitiveness (European Commission, 2009; OECD, 2008).8 
Equations (1) to (3) have been first estimated with pooled ordinary least squared (OLS). 
However, pooled OLS estimates suffer from a potential heterogeneity bias because 
establishment productivity and wages can be related to establishment-specific, time-invariant 
characteristics (such as the quality of management, ownership of a patent or other 
establishment idiosyncrasies) that are not measured in micro-level surveys. The traditional 
way to remove unobserved establishment characteristics that remained unchanged during the 
observation period is by estimating a fixed effects (FE) model. This boils down to estimate a 
within differentiated model, i.e. a model where the mean of each variable has been subtracted 
from the initial values. Given that our variable of interest, i.e. the region in which an 
establishment is located, is (almost) time-invariant, this approach cannot be applied. Hence, 
we relied on the system generalized method of moments (SYS-GMM), proposed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator is widely used in the 
literature to obtain consistent estimates of time-invariant regressors while controlling for 
establishment fixed effects (Roodman, 2009). It implies to simultaneously estimating a system 
of two equations (one in level and one in first differences) and to use ‘internal instruments’ to 
                                                             
8 Given that the cost of capital is not taken into account in the computation of the dependent variable, the latter 
does not reflect overall competiveness. If wage costs increase faster than productivity, overall competitiveness 
will be deteriorated only if other costs are not adjusted in compensation (OECD, 2008). 
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control for endogenous regressors.9 Interestingly, the SYS-GMM approach does not only 
enable to include time-invariant explanatory variables among covariates (which typically drop 
out  in  a  FE  or  difference  GMM  model),  but  also  to  account  for  the  persistency  in  
establishment-level productivity, wages and profits by adding the lagged dependent variable 
among regressors. This is important because the estimation of a static model would generate 
an omitted variable bias and cause autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors (i.e. lead to 
inconsistent estimates) if the adjustment process of dependent variables is dynamic 
(Wooldridge, 2010) as suggested by the literature.10 To examine the validity of our estimates, 
we applied Hansen’s (1982) and Arellano-Bond’s (1991) tests. The first is a test of over-
identification  which  allows  to  test  the  validity  of  the  instruments.  The  second  is  a  test  for  
autocorrelation, where the null hypothesis assumes no second order autocorrelation in the first 
differenced errors. The non-rejection of these two tests is required to assume that our 
estimates are reliable. In order to be as parsimonious as possible, we choose the model with 
the minimum number of lags that passes both tests. 
 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on a combination of two large data sets covering the period 
1999-2010. The first, carried out by Statistics Belgium, is the ‘Structure of Earnings Survey’ 
(SES). It is representative of all establishments operating in Belgium which employ at least 10 
workers  and  with  economic  activities  within  sections  C  to  K  of  the  NACE  Rev.1  
nomenclature.11 The survey contains a wealth of information, provided by the management of 
                                                             
9 All explanatory variables, except regions, industries, the level of collective wage bargaining and time, have 
been considered as endogenous in our SYS-GMM regressions. Put differently, variables showing very little or no 
variability over time have not been instrumented so as to avoid inconsistent estimates due to weak instrumenting. 
SYS-GMM estimates thus control for establishment fixed effects as well as for the endogeneity of time-varying 
explanatory variables (in addition to persistency in dependent variables and a large set of covariates). The 
potential non exogenous character of regions is addressed in the robustness tests’ section. 
10 From a theoretical perspective, competitive forces should eliminate abnormal profits (McMillan and Wohar, 
2011). Yet, a large literature (see e.g. Shepherd (1975) and McGahan and Porter (1999)) suggests that profit 
persistence is large and inconsistent with the competitive framework. More recent papers further show that firms 
with above (below) normal profits have high (low) barriers to entry and exit (McMillan and Wohar, 2011). In 
light of this so-called ‘persistence of profits literature’, there are strong arguments for modelling profits in a 
dynamic way, i.e. for including the lagged dependent variable among covariates in Equations (1) to (3). The 
assumption of persistent productivity both at the industry and firm level also finds some support in the literature 
(see e.g. Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). Researchers ‘documented, virtually without exception, enormous and 
persistent measured productivity differences across producers, even within narrowly defined industries’ 
(Syverson, 2011: 326). Large parts of these productivity differences are still hard to explain. The persistence of 
wage costs is also highlighted in the literature (see e.g. Fuss and Wintr, 2009; Heckel et al., 2008). Wage 
stickiness is notably the outcome of labour market institutions, adjustment costs and efficiency wages’ motives. 
11 It thus covers the following sectors: (i) mining and quarrying (C), (ii) manufacturing (D), (iii) electricity, gas 
and water supply (E), (iv) construction (F), v) wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles 
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establishments, both on the characteristics of the latter (e.g. sector of activity, number of 
employees, region where is establishment is located) and their workers (e.g. age, education, 
sex, tenure, gross earnings, working hours, occupations).12 The SES provides no financial 
information. It has therefore been merged with a firm-level survey, the ‘Structure of Business 
Survey’ (SBS). The SBS, also conducted by Statistics Belgium, provides information on 
financial variables such as investments, value added and gross output. The coverage of the 
SBS differs from that of the SES in that it does not cover the whole financial sector (NACE J) 
but only Other Financial Intermediation (NACE 652) and Activities Auxiliary to Financial 
Intermediation (NACE 67). The merger of the SES and SBS datasets has been carried out by 
Statistics Belgium using firms’ social security numbers. 
The computation of our explanatory variables (especially, those reflecting the 
composition of the labour force) requires a sufficient number of individual observations per 
establishment. We therefore eliminate (a very small number of) establishments with less than 
10 observations in a given year.13 We also exclude workers and/or establishments for which 
data are missing or inaccurate.14 Next, the estimation of capital stock through the ‘perpetual 
inventory method’ (OECD, 2009) requires to have information on investments for minimum 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
and personal and household goods (G), (vi) hotels and restaurants (H), (vii) transport, storage and 
communication (I), (viii) financial intermediation (J), and ix) real estate, renting and business activities (K). 
12 The SES is a stratified sample. The stratification criteria refer respectively to the region (NUTS-groups), the 
principal economic activity (NACE-groups) and the size of the establishments. The sample size in each stratum 
depends on the size of the establishment. Sampling percentages of establishments are respectively equal to 10, 
50 and 100 percent when the number of workers is lower than 50, between 50 and 99, and above 100. Within an 
establishment, sampling percentages of employees also depend on size. Sampling percentages of employees 
reach respectively 100, 50, 25, 14.3 and 10 percent when the number of workers is lower than 20, between 20 
and 50, between 50 and 99, between 100 and 199, and between 200 and 299. Establishments employing 300 
workers or more have to report information for an absolute number of employees. This number ranges between 
30 (for establishments with between 300 and 349 workers) and 200 (for firms with 12,000 workers or more). To 
guarantee that establishments report information on a representative sample of their workers, they are asked to 
follow a specific procedure. First, they have to rank their employees in alphabetical order. Next, Statistics 
Belgium gives them a random letter (e.g. the letter O) from which they have to start when reporting information 
on their employees (following the alphabetical order of workers' names in their list). If they reach the letter Z and 
still have to provide information on some of their employees, they have to continue from the letter A in their list. 
Moreover, firms that employ different categories of workers, namely managers, blue- and/or white-collar 
workers, have to set up a separate alphabetical list for each of these categories and to report information on a 
number of workers in these different groups that is proportional to their share in the firm’s total employment. For 
example, a firm with 300 employees (namely, 60 managers, 180 white-collar workers and 60 blue-collar 
workers) will have to report information on 30 workers (namely, 6 managers, 18 white-collar workers and 6 
blue-collar workers). For more details see Demunter (2000). 
13 Theoretically, the characteristics of the SES data set should guarantee that the minimum number of individual 
observations per establishment and per year is equal to 10 (see footnote 13). However, in practice, in less than 2 
percent of cases this minimum number of data points is not reached. This could be explained for instance by the 
fact that some establishments did not fill in the questionnaire for a sufficient number of their employees or 
because some questionnaires have been lost or not encoded by the administration. The average number of 
observations per establishment in each year is equal to 34 in our final sample. 
14 For instance, we eliminate a (very small) number of establishments for which the recorded value added was 
negative. 
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two  successive  periods.  This  restricts  our  sample  to  establishments  that  are  observed  in  at  
least two consecutive years. It leads to the over-representation of medium-sized and larger 
establishments since sampling percentages of establishments in our sample increase with the 
size of the latter.15 Finally, we restricted our sample to single-establishment firms (SEF). The 
rationale for doing this is that information on dependent variables (taken from the SBS) is at 
the level of the firm, while explanatory variables (taken from the SES) are measured at the 
establishment-level. Put differently, the dependent variable takes the same value for all 
establishments (potentially located in different regions) belonging to the same multi-
establishment firm (MEF). To avoid this aggregation bias, we focus on SEF only.16 Our final 
sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 7,418 establishment-year observations from 2,439 
establishments.17 It is representative of all medium-sized and large establishments employing 
at  least  10  employees  in  the  Belgian  private  sector,  with  the  exception  of  large  parts  of  the  
financial sector (NACE J) and the electricity, gas and water supply industry (NACE E). 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main variables broken down by region.18 
Results show that labour productivity is significantly higher in Brussels than in the two other 
regions. Moreover, they show that establishments in Flanders create on average more value 
added per hour of work than in Wallonia. The same hierarchy is found for hourly wage costs. 
However, the distribution of wage costs across regions is found to be more compressed than 
productivity differentials. Accordingly, descriptive statistics also show that cost 
competitiveness (i.e. the value-added wage gap) is greatest in Brussels, intermediate in 
Flanders and smallest in Wallonia. This is coherent with previous evidence and official 
regional accounts data (see e.g. ICN (2015), OECD (2015) and Rusinek and Tojerow (2014)). 
It is also in line with urban economics literature showing that areas in which economic 
                                                             
15 See footnote 13. 
16 This restriction reduces the number of establishments by approximately 24% (from 3,225 to 2,439 
establishments). The effect is more pronounced in Brussels (where the sample is trimmed by around 35%) than 
in Flanders and Wallonia (where the loss of establishments reaches respectively 23 and 20%). Descriptive 
statistics  by  regions  are  not  very  much  affected  by  this  restriction.  Those  for  SEF  (reported  in  Table  1)  are  
indeed quite similar to those obtained for our initial sample, including both single- and multi-establishment firms 
(see Appendix 1). 
17 Our data enable to follow establishments over time but not workers. 
18 All variables measured in monetary terms have been deflated to constant prices of 2004 by the consumer price 
index take from Statistics Belgium. Moreover, we notably control for year and sector dummies. As highlighted 
by Vandenberghe (2013: 34): ‘the introduction of these dummies can control for asymmetric variation in the 
price of firms’ outputs at sectoral level’. 
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activity is more concentrated (i.e. large and dense urban areas) tend to produce more value 
added per capita and to pay higher wages (see e.g. Ciccone and Hall (1996), Puga (2010) and 
Behrens et al. (2014)). Konings and Torfs (2011) show indeed that concentration of economic 
activity (i.e. the number companies per km2) is respectively bigger in Brussels than in 
Flanders and in Flanders than in Wallonia. Productivity and wage premia associated to more 
concentrated economic areas are notably explained by selection (i.e. more talented workers 
choose to locate in areas where economic density is bigger), sorting (i.e. competition among 
firms is stronger in more concentrated areas so that only the most productive ones survive) 
and agglomeration effects (i.e. the benefits that companies obtain by locating close to each 
other, such as labour market pooling, input-output linkages and knowledge spillovers). 
Table 1 further compares the average composition of the labour force within 
establishments across regions. Results notably show that the share of tertiary educated 
workers is substantially larger in Brussels than in the two other regions. This is most likely 
due  to  Brussels’  status  as  a  metropolitan  centre,  capital  of  Belgium  and  seat  of  various  
international institutions (e.g. European Union and NATO). Establishments located in 
Brussels also tend to employ more women and especially white-collar workers. This can be 
directly related to the sectoral distribution of establishments within regions. The share of 
establishments operating in services (particularly in wholesale and retail trade, hotels and 
restaurants, financial intermediation, and real estate, renting and business activities) is indeed 
much higher in Brussels. Put differently, the incidence of establishments operating in the 
manufacturing industry is substantially bigger in Flanders and Wallonia. 
Overall, descriptive statistics show that worker, job and establishment characteristics vary 
substantially across regions. Moreover, while inter-regional differences exist in both hourly 
wage costs and productivity, differences in productivity are found to be more important. What 
is the origin of these productivity and wage cost differentials? Can regional heterogeneity in 
worker, job and establishment characteristics alone account for these differentials? If the 
answer is no, are productivity and wage cost differentials well aligned across regions? These 
key questions concerning regional cost competitiveness are analysed in the remainder of this 
paper. 
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5. Results 
 
5.1. Benchmark estimates 
 
We first estimated equations (1) to (3) with pooled OLS. Results, presented in columns (1) to 
(3) of Table 2, show the impact of the region in which an establishment is located on its 
average hourly productivity, wage bill and cost competitiveness (i.e. productivity-wage gap) 
controlling for a wide range of observable characteristics.19 Estimates highlight that 
establishments located in Brussels are still significantly more productive than those in 
Flanders and Wallonia after controlling for compositional effects. The regression coefficient 
associated  to  Brussels  is  equal  to  0.091  (see  column  (1)).  It  means  that,  all  else  remaining  
constant, productivity in Brussels’ establishments is on average 9.5% higher than in 
Flanders.20 In contrast, labour productivity in Wallonia is estimated to be 2.8% lower than in 
Flanders. As regards wage cost differentials (see column (2)), they are found to be significant 
but  smaller  than  differences  in  productivity  after  controlling  for  covariates.  With  respect  to  
Brussels, the discount in average wage cost is measured at around 3.5% in both Flanders and 
Wallonia.21 As a consequence, cost competitiveness is found to be on average 2.4% lower in 
Wallonia than in Flanders and 5.9% higher in Brussels than in Flanders (see column 3). 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Yet, caution is required as these findings do neither control for establishment fixed 
effects nor for persistency in dependent variables. To take these issues into account, we re-
estimated equations (1) to (3) with the SYS-GMM estimator.22 Corresponding estimates are 
reported in columns (1’) to (3’) of Table 2. To examine their reliability, we applied the 
Hansen’s (1982) and Arellano-Bond’s (1991) tests. For all regressions, they do not reject 
respectively the null hypotheses of valid instruments and of no second order auto-correlation 
in first differenced errors. Regression coefficients confirm that establishments located in 
Brussels are significantly more productive than those in Flanders and Wallonia. Yet, the 
                                                             
19 Detailed OLS estimates (including regression coefficients associated to the control variables) are reported 
Appendix 2. 
20 Technically, this figure is obtained by taking the antilog (to base e) of the estimated coefficient from which 1 
is subtracted (x 100). As demonstrated by Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), this transformation is required when 
interpreting a dummy variable in a log-linear model. 
21 No significant wage cost differential is observed between Flanders and Wallonia. 
22 Apart from regions, industries, the level of collective wage bargaining and time dummies, all explanatory 
variables have been treated as endogenous. 
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productivity gap drops at below 5%. Moreover, average productivity is no longer found to be 
statistically different in Flanders and Wallonia. As regards wage costs differentials, they also 
become more compressed than in the OLS specification. Regional wage costs differentials 
reach less than 2 percent and are only weakly statistically significant between Brussels and 
Flanders. Overall, this leads to regression results reported in column (3’) which suggest that 
establishments located in Brussels are significantly more competitive (by around 3.5%) than 
those in the two other regions. They also indicate that the productivity-wage gap between 
Flanders and Wallonia is quite small and non-significant. 
 
5.2. Estimates across industries 
 
To investigate whether these results are sensitive to establishments’ sectoral affiliation, we re-
estimated equations (1) to (3) separately for industry and services.23 SYS-GMM estimates, 
reported in Table 3, are quite interesting. They basically show that previous results only hold 
for  services.  In  the  industry,  regression  coefficients  associated  to  regions  are  all  statistically  
insignificant. Regional productivity and wage cost differentials are thus found to vanish once 
dynamics and establishment fixed effects are accounted for. For services, results are quite 
different. On the one hand, they show that productivity of Brussels’ establishments is 
approximately 14% higher than that of those located in the two other regions (for which 
results are not statistically different). On the other, they suggest that regional wage cost 
differentials are much smaller and only statistically significant between Brussels and 
Flanders. Overall, this suggests (as highlighted by estimates in column (3’)) that cost 
competitiveness is approximately 5% higher in Brussels than in the two other regions. The 
productivity-wage gap between Flanders and Wallonia stands at around 1.6% (in favour of the 
former) but turns out to be statistically insignificant at conventional probability levels. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
23 Industry sectors refer to NACE codes C (Mining and quarrying), D (Manufacturing), E (Electricity, gas and 
water supply) and F (Construction). Services sectors include NACE codes G (Wholesale and retail trade; repair 
of motor vehicles, motorcycles and household goods), H (Hotels and restaurants), I (Transport, storage and 
communication), J (financial intermediation) and K (Real estate, renting and business activities). 
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5.3. Further robustness tests 
 
To test the robustness of these findings, we first examined whether results for services still 
hold if establishments operating in the financial intermediation sector (i.e. NACE code J) are 
excluded from the analysis. The rationale for doing this is that this sector of activity is 
somewhat over-represented in Brussels (see Table 1) and known for generating/providing 
remarkably above-average value-added, wages and profits (see e.g. du Caju et al., 2011, 
2012). Hence, although industry dummies are included as covariates in our regressions, it 
could be questioned whether results are robust to the exclusion of this sector. Results, 
reported in Table 4, confirm the higher productivity and cost competitiveness of Brussels’ 
establishments operating in services even when dropping NACE code J. However, the 
magnitude of the effects are smaller than before. While the productivity differential in favour 
of Brussels drops to 4.3%, regional wage gaps all become statistically insignificant. Overall, 
this still leads to a competitive advantage of 3.7% for establishments located in Brussels with 
respect to Flanders and Wallonia. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Estimates reported so far are unbiased under the hypothesis that establishments’ choice of 
location is independent of the latter’s average productivity and wage cost. However, if we 
assume that high productivity establishments prefer to settle down in locations where average 
productivity of their peers is highest, than regression coefficients associated with the most 
productive region will be upward biased. Konings and Marcolin (2014) argue and provide 
some empirical evidence suggesting that this self-selection issue is limited in Belgium 
because of linguistic and cultural barriers, especially between Flanders, on the one hand, and 
Brussels and Wallonia, on the other. Their argument, in line with Lazear (1999), is that 
economic success depends crucially on language proficiency and cultural proximity, as it 
reduces communication costs and fosters social interactions. Persyn and Torfs (2012) also 
suggest that regional borders are important to explain labour market dynamics in Belgium. 
The  authors  develop  a  gravity  model  to  analyse  the  determinants  of  the  spatial  structure  of  
commuting. Using data on 580 municipalities, their results show that regional borders act as a 
strong barrier to commuting. Hence, they also suggest that self-selection issues should be 
limited in our econometric investigation. 
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[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Anyway,  to  examine  whether  our  results  are  affected  by  this  potential  bias,  we  re-
estimated equations (1) to (3) for older establishments, i.e. establishments existing since at 
least 10 years. The rationale for doing this is that the benefits from settling down in a 
particular region should be especially important in the early life of a company, soon after its 
creation (Konings and Marcolin, 2014). Put differently, self-selection is expected to be less of 
a concern for older establishments. SYS-GMM estimates for older establishments, operating 
respectively in industry and services, are reported in Table 5.24 Results for the industry are in 
line with our benchmark specification (see Table 3) as they all remain statistically 
insignificant. Regarding services, as expected, we find that the coefficient associated to 
Brussels in the productivity regression was somewhat upward biased in Table 3. It indeed 
decreases from 0.133 to 0.115 when focusing on older establishments. Yet, it remains highly 
significant. Concerning labour costs, the coefficient associated to Brussels decreases from 
0.025 to 0.015 and becomes statistically insignificant. In the end, estimates for older 
establishments still suggest that cost competitiveness in services is approximately 5% higher 
in Brussels than in the two other regions. The productivity-wage gap in services between 
Flanders and Wallonia stands at almost 2% (in favour of the former) but is again statistically 
insignificant. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
An alternative approach to test for productivity-wage gaps with establishment-level data 
has been recently proposed by Bartolluci (2014). The author suggests to estimate a wage 
equation, similar to the one specified by Hellerstein and Neumark (1995) (see equation (2)), 
and to include average establishment-level productivity as an additional control variable. This 
method has been shown to be somewhat more flexible than that of Hellerstein and Neumark 
(1995) notably because it doesn’t impose that the elasticity of wages with respect to 
productivity is equal to 1. Moreover, it avoids the estimation of a production function and 
hence the choice of an appropriate functional form for the latter. To examine the robustness of 
our findings to this alternative strategy, we estimated a Bartolucci-type wage equation using a 
                                                             
24 Comparing estimates according to establishments’ age is a convenient way to examine the sensitivity of our 
results to a potential self-selection issue. Yet, it does not constitute a formal statistical test for the existence of 
such phenomenon. 
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SYS-GMM estimator. Results are reported in Table 6. When considering all establishments, 
irrespective of their age, estimates (see columns (1) and (2)) suggest that regions generate no 
significant productivity-wage gap, neither in industry nor in services. Moreover, if we focus 
on older establishments so as to account for potential self-selection issues, results than 
become perfectly in line with earlier findings based on the Hellerstein and Neumark (1995) 
approach. Indeed, as shown in columns (1’) and (2’), estimates remain statistically 
insignificant for the industry, while those for services indicate that mean labour costs are 
approximately 4% lower in Brussels than in the two other regions after controlling for 
differences in productivity and other covariates. Put differently, results again suggest that cost 
competitiveness in services is significantly higher in Brussels than in the two other regions 
(which in turn are found to be equally competitive). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper estimates the impact of the region in which an establishment is located on its 
average hourly productivity, wage bill and cost competitiveness (i.e. productivity-wage gap). 
It contributes significantly to the existing literature as it is one of the first to: (1) extend the 
traditional analysis of inter-regional wage differentials to productivity and productivity-wage 
gaps using large representative micro-data (i.e. Belgian linked employer-employee panel data 
covering most private-sector establishments over the period 1999-2010); (2) rely on both the 
Hellerstein and Neumark (1995) and Bartolucci (2014) methodological approaches; (3) 
control for a wide range of covariates and address important econometric issues (such as 
establishment-level fixed effects, endogeneity and state-dependence); and (4) investigate the 
moderating role of the establishment’s sectoral affiliation in the region-productivity-wage 
nexus. 
Descriptive statistics show that hourly productivity is highest in Brussels, intermediate in 
Flanders and lowest in Wallonia. The ranking of regions in terms of hourly wage cost is 
similar. Yet, given that gross regional wage differentials are more compressed than 
differences in productivity, cost competitiveness is also found to be greatest in Brussels, 
middle in Flanders and smallest in Wallonia. These descriptive statistics, coherent with 
official regional accounts data (ICN, 2015; OECD, 2015), are in line with urban economics 
literature showing that areas in which economic activity is more concentrated (i.e. large and 
dense urban areas) tend to produce more value added per capita and to pay higher wages (see 
e.g. Ciccone and Hall (1996), Puga (2010) and Behrens et al. (2014)). 
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To get a better understanding of the drivers of these gross inter-regional differences in 
productivity and wages, we first run simple OLS regressions controlling for a large set of 
worker, job and establishment characteristics. Results interestingly show that compositional 
effects (i.e. regional differences in human capital, labour contracts, occupations, sectors, 
establishment size and capital intensity, among other variables) account for a substantial part 
of the variability in productivity and wages across regions. Yet, the same inter-regional 
pattern is still obtained. Cost competitiveness is indeed found to be on average 2.4% lower in 
Wallonia than in Flanders and 5.9% higher in Brussels than in Flanders. Estimated differences 
in productivity across regions thus remain somewhat bigger than those in terms of wages even 
after controlling for observed heterogeneity. Konings and Marcolin (2014) ran similar OLS 
regressions, albeit with a smaller set of covariates (human capital variables were notably not 
included in their analysis). Our estimates back up their conclusion according to which cost 
competitiveness is somewhat smaller in Wallonia than in Flanders. However, the magnitude 
of the estimated effect is smaller in our setup which is not surprising given the larger number 
of covariates. In contrast, results for Brussels differ in both studies. While Konings and 
Marcolin (2014) suggest that the productivity-wage gap is significantly smaller in Brussels 
than in Flanders, we find the reverse outcome. Differences in sampling characteristics may 
provide an explanation for this discrepancy. Indeed, while descriptive statistics in Konings 
and Marcolin (2014) suggest that productivity and, to a lesser extent, wages are higher in 
Flanders than in Brussels, our data show the opposite (which, as highlighted earlier, is more in 
line with official regional accounts data (ICN, 2015; OECD, 2015)). 
This said, OLS estimates should be considered with great caution as they are subject to a 
range of measurement issues (i.e. establishment fixed effects, endogeneity and persistence in 
dependent variables). To address these issues, we relied on a dynamic SYS-GMM estimator 
and had a specific focus on older establishments (for which self-selection is likely to be less 
of a concern). SYS-GMM estimates show that differences between Flanders and Wallonia in 
terms of productivity, wages and cost competitiveness are statistically insignificant both in the 
industry and services. The same outcome is obtained when using a static SYS-GMM 
specification (i.e. not controlling for persistence)25 and when focusing on all establishments 
(i.e. not accounting for potential self-selection). This suggests that the higher performance 
(i.e. productivity and competitiveness) of Flanders with respect to Wallonia reported in our 
OLS regressions can actually be attributed to regional differences in time-invariant 
                                                             
25 Though (as expected) the p-value associated to the AR(2) test is below 5 per cent with the static estimator. 
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unobserved establishment characteristics (e.g. specific workers’ skills, management talent, 
patents or other establishment idiosyncrasies that are not observed in our data). 
As regards Brussels, SYS-GMM estimates indicate that conclusions vary according to 
establishments’ sectoral affiliation. In the industry, results show no significant difference 
between Brussels and the two other regions in terms of productivity, wages and 
competitiveness.26 In services, findings are quite different. Indeed, SYS-GMM estimates 
show a significant premium for establishments located in Brussels (with respect to Flanders 
and Wallonia) both in terms of productivity and cost competitiveness. When excluding the 
financial intermediation sector (over-represented in Brussels and known to generate above-
average valued added and profits), this premium still reaches around 4 percent. This result 
suggests that establishments operating in services benefit from agglomeration effects when 
they choose to locate in Brussels.27 The absence of a similar effect in the industry is not 
surprising as Brussels, like most global cities (Sassen, 1991), is essentially offering relatively 
high-skilled jobs in the tertiary sector. 28, 29, 30 
To sum up, our findings show that inter-regional differences in productivity and wages 
vanish almost totally when controlling for a large set of covariates, establishment fixed effects 
and endogeneity. The only significant (and positive) productivity-wage gap is encountered in 
the Brussels’ tertiary sector. Overall, estimates thus suggest that wage cost and productivity 
differentials are ceteris paribus relatively well aligned across regions.31 
                                                             
26 The discrepancy between OLS and SYS-GMM estimates for establishments operating in Brussels’ industry 
can also be ascribed to regional differences in establishment fixed effects. 
27 Selection and sorting effects are likely to be controlled for by our focus on older establishments and the use of 
a SYS-GMM estimator. Yet, caution is required because distinguishing sorting from agglomeration effects is not 
straightforward. This said, our interpretation is in line with Combes et al. (2012) who show that French 
establishments are more productive in larger cities due to agglomeration rather than sorting effects. 
28 The phenomenon of congestion may also account for this outcome (Graham, 2007). Indeed, it typically 
disfavours agglomerations (such as Brussels) and is clearly more relevant for industry (relying more on 
transport) than services. 
29 Given that economic density is on average bigger in Flanders than in Wallonia (Konings and Torfs, 2011), one 
might also wonder why agglomeration effects do not show up in the former region. As highlighted by Brakman 
et al. (2009), this is likely due to the fact that the geographical delimitation of pooled labour markets (i.e. 
clusters) does usually not coincide with administrative frontiers. Put differently, agglomeration effects are 
probably only observed in Brussels’ tertiary sector because the matching between pooled labour markets and 
Belgian administrative regions is imperfect (as suggested by e.g. Dujardin et al, 2007; Konings and Torfs, 2011; 
Riguelle et al., 2007; Tannier and Thomas, 2013). 
30 Our paper aims to assess whether productivity-wage gaps exist among Belgian administrative regions. The 
investigation of employment clusters and agglomeration effects at a more disaggregated level is thus beyond the 
scope of the latter. 
31 Interestingly, other variables have been found to generate much larger and significant productivity-wage gaps 
than regions. Rycx et al. (2015) for instance highlight that establishments located in the Belgian private sector 
face financial disincentives to employing lower-educated workers. More precisely, they show that establishments 
employing a larger share of low-educated workers tend, all else being equal, to be less profitable (i.e. to report 
significantly smaller productivity-wage gaps). Workers’ age has also been found to generate productivity-wage 
gaps in the Belgian private economy. Indeed, multiple studies (Cataldi et al., 2011, 2012; Lallemand and Rycx, 
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Further investigation is required to provide a better understanding of the regional 
productivity-wage nexus in other advanced economies with marked differences in 
unemployment rates across regions (e.g. Italy, Spain or the UK). Extending the approaches 
offered by Hellerstein and Neumark (1995) and/or Bartolucci (2014) to account for 
differences in latent productivity and wage costs of unemployed people would also be a 
compelling avenue for future research. 
 
References 
 
Ammermüller A., Lucifora C., Origo F. and Zwick T. (2010), “Wage flexibility in regional 
labour markets: evidence from Italy and Germany”, Regional Studies, 44(4): 401-421. 
Arellano, M. and Bond, O. (1991), “Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations”, Review of Economic Studies: 58, 
277-297. 
Arellano, M. and Bover, O. (1995), “Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of 
error-component models”, Journal of Econometrics, 68: 28-51. 
Baert, S., Cockx, B., Gheyle, N., Vandamme, C. (2015), “Is there less discrimination in 
occupations where recruitment is difficult?”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 68: 
467-500. 
Bande R., Fernandez M. and Montuega V. (2008), “Regional unemployment in Spain: 
disparities, business cycle and wage setting”, Labour Economics, 15: 885-914. 
Bartelsman, E. and Doms, M. (2000), “Understanding productivity: lessons from longitudinal 
microdata”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122: 1721-1758. 
Bartolucci, C. (2014), “Understanding the native-immigrant wage-gap using matched 
employer-employee data: evidence from Germany”, Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, 67(4): 1166-1202. 
Bayard,  K.,  Hellerstein,  J.,  Neumark,  D.  and  Troske,  K.  (2003),  “New  evidence  on  sex  
segregation and sex differences in wages from matched employer-employee data”, Journal 
of Labor Economics, 21(4): 887-922. 
Behrens, K., Duranton, G. and Robert-Nicoud, F. (2014), “Productive cities: sorting, selection 
and agglomeration”, Journal of Political Economy, 122(3): 507-553. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
2009; Vandenberghe, 2011, 2013) have shown that older workers tend to be ‘over-paid’ (at given productivity) 
with respect to their younger co-workers. 
20
 
 
Berlemann, M. and Wesselhöft, J.-E. (2014), “Estimating aggregate capital stocks using the 
perpetual inventory method: a survey of previous implementations an new empirical 
evidence for 103 countries”, Review of Economics, 65: 1-34. 
Blackaby, D. and Murphy, P. (1995), “Earnings, unemployment and Britain’s North-South 
divide: real or Imaginary?”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 57(4): 487-512. 
Blanchflower, D. and Oswald, A. (1994), The Wage Curve, MIT Press, Cambridge (Ma.). 
Blien,  U.,  Dauth,  W.,  Schank,  T.  and  Schnable,  C.  (2013),  “The  institutional  context  of  an  
‘empirical law’: the wage curve under different regimes of collective bargaining”, British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 51(1): 59-79. 
Blinder, A. (1973), “Wage discrimination: reduced form and structural variables”, Journal of 
Human Resources, 8: 436-465. 
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. (1998), “Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic 
panel data models”, Journal of Econometrics, 87: 115-143. 
Brakman, S., Garretsen, H. and van Marrewijk, C. (2009), The New Introduction to 
Geographical Economics, Cambridge University Press, New York. 
Brunello G., Lupi C. and Ordine P. (2001), “Widening differences in Italian regional 
unemployment”, Labour Economics, 8: 103-129. 
Cahuc, P., Carcillo, S. and Zylberberg, A. (2014), Labor Economics, MIT Press, Cambridge 
(Ma.). 
Cardoso, A., Guimaraes, P. and Varejao, J. (2011), “Are older workers worthy of their pay? 
An empirical investigation of age-productivity and age-wage nexuses”, De Economist, 
159(2): 95-111. 
Cataldi, A., Kampelmann, S. and Rycx, F. (2011), “Productivity-wage gaps among age 
groups: does the ICT environment matter?”, De Economist, 159(2): 193-22. 
Cataldi, A., Kampelmann, S. and Rycx, F. (2012), “Does it pay to be productive? The case of 
age groups”, International Journal of Manpower, 33(3): 264-283. 
Ciccone, A. and Hall, R. (1996), “Productivity and the density of economic activity”, 
American Economic Review, 86(1): 54-70. 
Combes, P.-P., Duranton, L., Puga, D. and Roux, S. (2012), “The productivity advantage of 
large cities: distinguishing agglomeration from firm selection”, Econometrica, 80(6): 
2543-2594. 
Davies, S. and Hallet, M. (2001), “Policy responses to regional unemployment: Lessons from 
Germany, Spain and Italy”, European Commission Economic Papers, No. 161, Brussels. 
21
 
 
Demunter, C. (2000), “Structure and dispersion of earnings survey”, Statistics Belgium 
Working Paper, Brussels. 
Devicienti, F., Grinza, E. and Vannoni, D. (2015), “The impact of part-time work on firm 
total factor productivity: evidence from Italy”, IZA Discussion Paper, No. 9463, Bonn. 
Dejemeppe, M. and Van der Linden, B. (2006), “Action du Plan Marschall sur le marché du 
travail wallon”, Regards économiques, 40, IRES, UCL. 
Dobbelaere, S. and Mairesse, J. (2015), “Comparing micro-evidence on rent sharing from 
three different approaches”, NBER Working Paper, No. 16220, Cambridge (Ma.). 
du Caju, P., Rycx, F. and Tojerow, I. (2011), “Inter-industry wage differentials: how much 
does rent sharing matter?”, Manchester School, 79(4): 691-717. 
du Caju, P., Rycx, F. and Tojerow, I. (2012), “Wage structure effects of international trade in 
a small open economy: the case of Belgium”, Review of World Economics, 148(2): 297-
331. 
Dujardin, C., Thomas, I. and Tulkens, H. (2007), “Quelles frontiers pour Bruxelles? Une mise 
à jour”, Reflets et Perspectives de la vie économique, XLVI(2-3): 155-176. 
Elhorst, J. (2003), “The mystery of regional unemployment differentials: theoretical and 
empirical explanations”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 17(5): 709-748. 
European Commission (2009), European Competitiveness Report 2009, Publications Office 
of the European Union, Luxembourg. 
Eurostat (2016), EU Labour Force Survey, Luxembourg. 
Fuss, C. and Wintr, L. (2009), “Rigid labour compensation and flexible employment? Firm-
level evidence with regard to productivity for Belgium”, ECB Working Paper, No. 1021, 
Frankfurt. 
Garcia, I. and Molina, J. (2002), “Inter-regional wage differentials in Spain”, Applied 
Economics Letters, 9: 209-215. 
Garnero, A., Kampelmann, S., Rycx, F. (2014a), “Part-time work, wages and productivity: 
evidence from Belgian matched panel data”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 67(3): 
926-954. 
Garnero, A., Kampelmann, S., Rycx, F. (2014b), “The heterogeneous effects of workplace 
diversity on productivity, wages and profits”, Industrial Relations, 53(3): 430-477. 
Göbel, C., Zwick, T. 2009. Age and productivity: evidence from linked employer employee 
data, ZEW Discussion Paper, No. 09-020, Mannheim. 
Görzig, B., Gornig, M. and Werwatz, A. (2005), “Explaining Eastern Germany’s wage gap: 
the impact of structural change”, Post-Communist Economies, 17(4): 449-464. 
22
 
 
Graham, D. (2007), “Variable returns to agglomeration and the effect of road traffic 
congestion”, Journal of Urban Economics, 62(1): 103-120. 
Haegeland, T. and Klette, T. (1999), “Do higher wages reflect higher productivity? Education, 
gender and experience premiums in a matched plant-worker data set”, in Haltiwanger, J., 
Lane, J, Spletzer, J., Theeuwes, J. and Troske, T. (ed.), The Creation and analysis of 
Employer-employee Matched Data, North-Holland, Elsevier, 231-259. 
Halvorsen, R. and Palmquist, R. (1980), “The interpretation of dummy variables in 
semilogarithmic equations”, American Economic Review, 70(3): 474-475. 
Hansen, L. (1982), “Large sample properties of generalized method of moment estimators”, 
Econometrica, 50: 1029-1054. 
Harberger, A. (1978), “Perspectives on capital and technology in less developed countries”, in 
Artis, M. and Nobay, A. (eds.), Contemporary Economic Analysis, London, 42–72. 
Heckel, T., Le Bihan, H. and Montornès, J. (2008), “Sticky wages: evidence from quarterly 
microeconomic data”, ECB Working Paper, No. 893, Frankfurt. 
Hellerstein J. and Neumark D. (1995), “Are earnings profiles steeper than productivity 
profiles? Evidence from Israeli firm data”, Journal of Human Resources, 30(1): 89-112. 
Hellerstein, J. and Neumark, D. (2004), “Production function and wage equation estimation 
with heterogeneous labor: Evidence from a new matched employer-employee data set”, 
NBER Working Paper, No. 10365, Cambridge (Ma.). 
Hellerstein J., Neumark D. and Troske K. (1999), “Wages, productivity and worker 
characteristics: evidence from plant-level production functions and wage equations”, 
Journal of Labor Economics, 17(2): 409-446. 
Ilmakunnas, P. and Maliranta, M. (2005), “Technology, labour characteristics and wage-
productivity gaps”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 67(5), 623-645. 
Institut des Comptes Nationaux (2015), Comptes régionaux 2013, Banque nationale de 
Belgique, Brussels 
Janssens, S. and Konings, J. (1998), “One more wage curve: the case of Belgium”, Economics 
Letters, 60: 223-227. 
Juhn C., K. Murphy and B. Pierce (1993), “Wage inequality and the rise in return to skills”, 
Journal of Political Economy, 101: 410-442. 
Konings, J. and Marcolin, L. (2014), “Do wages reflect labor productivity? The case of 
Belgian regions”, IZA Journal of European Labor Studies, 3:11. 
23
 
 
Konings, J. and Torfs, W. (2011), “Fiscal Federalism, Tax Competition and Economic 
Agglomeration”, in Fiscal Federalism in the European Union: EU Presidency Seminar, 
Larcier, p. 35-56. 
Lallemand, T. and Rycx, F. (2009), “Are older workers harmful for firm productivity?”, De 
Economist, 157(3): 273-292. 
Lazear, E. (1999), “Culture and language”, Journal of Political Economy, 107: 95-126. 
Lebedinski, L. and Vandenberghe, V. (2014), “Assessing education’s contribution to 
productivity using firm-level evidence”, International Journal of Manpower, 35(8): 1116-
1139. 
Lopez N. and Sissoko S. (2013), “Understanding wage determination in a multi-level 
bargaining system: A panel data analysis”, Empirical Economics, 44: 879-897. 
Lucifora, C. and Origo, F. (1999), ‘Alla ricerca della flessibilità: un’analisi della curva dei 
salari in Italia’, Rivista Italiana degli Economisti, 1: 3-35. 
Machado, J. and Mata, J. (2005), “Counterfactual decomposition of changes in wage 
distributions using quantile regressions”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 20: 445-465. 
Mahlberg, B., Freund, I., Cuaresma J., Prskawets, A. (2013), “Ageing productivity and wages 
in Austria”, Labour Economics, 22: 5-15. 
Manning A. (2011), “Imperfect competition in the labor market”, in: Ashenfelter O. and Card 
D. (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier: 973-1041. 
Martin, P., Mayer, T., Mayneris, F. (2011). “Spatial concentration and plant-level productivity 
in France”, Journal of Urban Economics, 69: 182-195. 
McGahan, A. and Porter, M. (1999), “The persistence of shocks to profitability”, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 81: 143-153. 
McGuinness, S., Kelly, E. and O’Connell, P. (2010), “The impact of wage bargaining on 
firm-level competitiveness and wage inequality: the case of Ireland”, Industrial Relations, 
49: 593-615. 
McMillan, D. and Wohar, M. (2011), “Profit-persistence revisited: the case of the UK, 
Manchester School, 79: 510-527. 
Mincer, J. (1974), Schooling, Experience and Earning, Columbia University Press, New-
York. 
Monastiriotis, V. (2002), “Inter- and intra-regional wage inequalities in the UK: sources and 
evolution”, LSE Research Paper in Environmental and Spatial Analysis, No. 70, London. 
Mortensen, D. (2003), Wage Dispersion. Why Are Similar Workers Paid Differently?, MIT 
Press, Cambridge (Ma.). 
24
 
 
Nopo, H. (2008), “Matching as a tool to decompose wage gaps”, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 90(2): 290-299. 
Oaxaca, R. (1973), “Male-female wage differentials in urban labour markets”, International 
Economic Review, 14: 693-709. 
OECD (2008), OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, Paris. 
OECD (2009), Measuring Capital, Paris. 
OECD (2012), Economic Policy Reforms 2012: Going for Growth, Paris. 
OECD (2013), OECD Economic Surveys: Belgium, Paris 
OECD (2015), Regional Accounts, Paris. 
Pereira, J. and Galego, A. (2014), “Inter-regional wage differentials in Portugal: an analysis 
across the wage distribution”, Regional Studies, 48(9): 1529-1546. 
Persyn, D. and Torfs, W. (2012), “A gravity equation for commuting”, VIVES Discussion 
Paper, No. 33, Leuven. 
Pfeifer C. and Wagner J. (2012), “Age and gender composition of the workforce, productivity 
and  profits:  Evidence  from  a  new  type  of  data  for  German  entreprises”,  IZA  Discussion  
Paper, No. 6381, Bonn. 
Plasman, R., Rycx, F. and Tojerow, I. (2007), “Wage differentials in Belgium: the role of 
worker and employer characteristics”, Brussels Economic Review, 50(1): 11-38. 
Plasman, R., Rusinek, M. and Tojerow, I. (2007), “La régionalisation de la négociation 
salariale en Belgique: vraie nécessité ou faux débat?”, Reflets et Perspectives de la vie 
économique, 46(2-3): 65-74. 
Puga, D. (2010), “The magnitude and causes of agglomeration economies”, Journal of 
Regional Studies, 50(1): 2013-219. 
Riguelle, F., Thomas, I. and Verhetsel, A. (2007), “Measuring urban polycentrism: a 
European case study and its implications”, Journal of Economic Geography, 7(2): 193-
215. 
Roodman, D. (2009), “How to do xtabond2: an introduction to difference and system GMM 
in Stata”, Stata Journal, 9(1): 86-136. 
Rosen, S. (1974), “Hedonic prices and implicit markets”, Journal of Political Economy, 
81(2): 34-55. 
Rusinek, M. and Tojerow, I. (2014), “The regional dimension of collective wage bargaining: 
the case of Belgium”, Regional Studies, 48(2): 301-317. 
Russo, G. and Hassink, W. (2012), “Multiple glass ceilings”, Industrial Relations, 51(4): 892-
915. 
25
 
 
Rycx, F., Saks, Y. and Tojerow, I. (2015), “Does education raise productivity and wages 
equally?”, National Bank of Belgium Working Paper, No. 281, Brussels. 
Saks Y. (2014), “Employees: too expensive at 50? The age component in wage-setting”, 
Economic Review, National Bank of Belgium, June: 67-81. 
Sassen, S. (1991), The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo, Princeton University Press. 
Shepherd, W. (1975), The Treatment of Market Power,  Columbia  University  Press,  New  
York. 
Simon, H., Ramos, R. and Sanroma, E. (2006), “Collective bargaining and regional 
differences in Spain: and empirical analysis”, Applied Economics, 38: 1749-1760. 
Simon, H. and Russell, H. (2004), ‘Firms and the gender wage gap: a cross-national 
comparison’, Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper, London. 
Syverson, C. (2011), “What determines productivity?”, Journal of Economic Literature, 49: 
326-365. 
Tannier, C. and Thomas, I. (2013), “Defining and characterizing urban boundaries: a fractal 
analysis of theoretical cities and Belgian cities”, Computers, Environment and Urban 
Systems, 41: 234-248. 
van Ours, J., Stoeldraijer, L. (2011), “Age, wage and productivity in Dutch manufacturing”, 
De Economist, 159: 113-137. 
Vandenberghe, V. (2011), “Boosting the employment rate of older men and women. An 
empirical assessment using Belgian firm-level data on productivity and labour costs”, De 
Economist, 159(2): 159-191. 
Vandenberghe, V. (2013), “Are firms willing to employ a greying and feminizing 
workforce?”, Labour Economics, 22: 30-46. 
Wooldridge, J. (2010), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT Press, 
Cambridge (Ma.). 
Zeilstra A. and Elhorst P. (2014), “Integrated analysis of regional and national unemployment 
differentials in the European Union”, Regional Studies, 48(10): 1739-1755. 
  
26
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics at the establishment-level by region, 1999-2010 
 Flanders Brussels Wallonia 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Value-added per hour (ln) a 3.78 0.46 3.95 0.84 3.75 0.49 
Wage cost per hour (ln) a 3.39 0.31 3.48 0.43 3.36 0.38 
Value added-wage gap (ln) a,b  0.40 0.32 0.47 0.60 0.39 0.29 
Share of workers with primary or lower 
secondary education 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.31 
Share of workers with higher secondary 
education 0.45 0.29 0.33 0.26 0.41 0.28 
Share of workers with tertiary education 0.23 0.22 0.39 0.34 0.24 0.25 
Share of workers with 10 years of tenure or more 0.39 0.22 0.32 0.23 0.38 0.24 
Share of workers < 30 years 0.22 0.13 0.21 0.15 0.21 0.14 
Share of workers > 49 years 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.13 
Share of women 0.24 0.22 0.29 0.22 0.22 0.21 
Share of part-time workers (less than 30 hours 
per week) 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.15 
Share of blue-collar workers 0.62 0.30 0.36 0.37 0.61 0.31 
Share of workers with fixed-term contracts 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.09 
Share of apprentices 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Share of temporary agency workers 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.05 
Industry:       
Mining and quarrying (C) 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.14 
Manufacturing (D) 0.61 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.61 0.49 
Electricity, gas and water 
supply (E) 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.02 
Construction (F) 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles and personal and 
household goods (G) 0.10 0.30 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.31 
Hotels and restaurant (H) 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.09 
Transport, storage and communication (I) 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.24 
Financial intermediation (J) 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.14 
Real estate, renting and business activities (K) 0.08 0.28 0.25 0.43 0.06 0.24 
Firm-level collective agreement 0.29 0.45 0.12 0.33 0.26 0.44 
Employment (ln) 5.00 1.00 4.37 1.13 4.64 1.07 
Establishment age >= 10 years c 0.94 0.25 0.85 0.36 0.89 0.32 
Capital stock per worker (ln) a 10.84 1.46 10.51 1.96 10.79 1.40 
Number of establishment-year observations 4,215 1,009 2,194 
Number of establishments 1,385 332 722 
Notes: a All variables measured in monetary terms have been deflated to constant prices of 2004 by the consumer price 
index taken from Statistics Belgium. b Value added-wage cost gap (ln) = ln(value added per hour) – ln(wage cost per 
hour). c Our data set does not provide direct information on the age of the establishment. This variable has been proxied 
with the seniority of the establishment’s most senior employee. 
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Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics at the establishment-level by region, MEF & SEFa, 1999-2010 
 Flanders Brussels Wallonia 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Value-added per hour (ln) b 3.81 0.48 3.92 0.78 3.76 0.51 
Wage cost per hour (ln) b 3.41 0.32 3.48 0.42 3.37 0.39 
Value added-wage gap (ln) b,c  0.41 0.33 0.44 0.55 0.38 0.29 
Share of workers with primary or lower 
secondary education 0.31 0.30 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.31 
Share of workers with higher secondary 
education 0.45 0.28 0.35 0.27 0.42 0.28 
Share of workers with tertiary education 0.25 0.24 0.39 0.33 0.25 0.25 
Share of workers with 10 years of tenure or more 0.39 0.23 0.32 0.23 0.39 0.25 
Share of workers < 30 years 0.22 0.14 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.14 
Share of workers > 49 years 0.16 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.13 
Share of women 0.25 0.22 0.31 0.23 0.22 0.22 
Share of part-time workers (less than 30 hours 
per week) 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.14 
Share of blue-collar workers 0.59 0.32 0.33 0.36 0.59 0.32 
Share of workers with fixed-term contracts 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.09 
Share of apprentices 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Share of temporary agency workers 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.06 
Industry:       
Mining and quarrying (C) 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.14 
Manufacturing (D) 0.60 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.59 0.49 
Electricity, gas and water 
supply (E) 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 
Construction (F) 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.29 
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles and personal and 
household goods (G) 0.11 0.31 0.18 0.38 0.13 0.34 
Hotels and restaurant (H) 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.21 0.01 0.11 
Transport, storage and communication (I) 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24 
Financial intermediation (J) 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.14 
Real estate, renting and business activities (K) 0.10 0.30 0.23 0.42 0.07 0.25 
Firm-level collective agreement 0.30 0.46 0.17 0.37 0.28 0.45 
Employment (ln) 5.10 1.09 4.56 1.21 4.66 1.11 
Establishment age >= 10 years c 0.93 0.25 0.86 0.35 0.90 0.31 
Capital stock per worker (ln) b 10.85 1.50 10.52 1.92 10.83 1.43 
Number of establishment-year observations 6,089 1,740 3,045 
Number of establishments 1,806 516 903 
Notes: a Establishments belonging to both multi- and single-establishment firms. b All variables measured in monetary terms 
have been deflated to constant prices of 2004 by the consumer price index taken from Statistics Belgium. c Value added-wage 
cost gap (ln) = ln(value added per hour) – ln(wage cost per hour). d Our data set does not provide direct information on the age 
of the establishment. This variable has been proxied with the seniority of the establishment’s most senior employee. 
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Appendix 2: Detailed OLS estimates, 1999-2010 
 Value added 
per hour 
worked (ln) 
Wage cost 
per hour 
worked (ln) 
Value added-
wage  
gap (ln) a 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Flanders 
 
Reference 
 
Reference Reference 
Brussels 0.091*** 
(0.020) 
0.034*** 
(0.012) 
0.057*** 
(0.016) 
Wallonia -0.028*** 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.024*** 
(0.008) 
Share of workers with primary or lower secondary 
education 
Reference 
 
Reference Reference 
Share of workers with higher secondary education 0.011** 
(0.017) 
0.032*** 
(0.009) 
-0.021 
(0.013) 
Share of workers with tertiary education 0.707*** 
(0.038) 
0.604*** 
(0.025) 
0.103*** 
(0.027) 
Share of workers with 10 years of tenure or more 0.197*** 
(0.031) 
0.164*** 
(0.018) 
0.034 
(0.023) 
Share of workers < 30 years -0.164*** 
(0.047) 
-0.270*** 
(0.022) 
0.106*** 
(0.036) 
Share of workers > 49 years 0.150*** 
(0.055) 
0.115*** 
(0.029) 
0.035 
(0.045) 
Share of women -0.040 
(0.026) 
-0.177*** 
(0.016) 
0.137*** 
(0.021) 
Share of part-time workers (less than 30 hours per week) -0.296*** 
(0.038) 
-0.244*** 
(0.028) 
-0.051* 
(0.027) 
Share of blue-collar workers -0.198*** 
(0.029) 
-0.169*** 
(0.020) 
-0.028 
(0.020) 
Share of workers with fixed-term contracts -0.026 
(0.061) 
-0.068 
(0.062) 
0.042 
(0.041) 
Share of apprentices -1.599*** 
(0.623) 
-1.384*** 
(0.284) 
-0.215 
(0.479) 
Share of temporary agency workers -0.140 
(0.100) 
-0.224*** 
(0.056) 
0.084 
(0.076) 
Industry:    
Mining and quarrying (C) 0.244*** 
(0.051) 
0.093*** 
(0.028) 
0.151*** 
(0.042) 
Manufacturing (D) Reference 
 
Reference Reference 
Electricity, gas and water 
supply (E) 
1.735*** 
(0.593) 
0.235*** 
(0.062) 
1.500*** 
(0.545) 
Construction (F) -0.061*** 
(0.012) 
0.028*** 
(0.008) 
-0.089*** 
(0.010) 
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles and personal and household goods (G) 
-0.045** 
(0.020) 
-0.025** 
(0.011) 
-0.021 
(0.015) 
Hotels and restaurant (H) -0.231*** 
(0.054) 
-0.149*** 
(0.045) 
-0.082*** 
(0.026) 
Transport, storage and communication (I) -0.123*** 
(0.023) 
-0.066*** 
(0.021) 
-0.057*** 
(0.016) 
Financial intermediation (J) 0.284*** 
(0.088) 
0.037 
(0.068) 
0.247*** 
(0.060) 
Real estate, renting and business activities (K) -0.108*** 
(0.024) 
-0.016 
(0.016) 
-0.092*** 
(0.019) 
Firm-level collective agreement 0.067*** 
(0.012) 
0.051*** 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
Employment (ln) 0.027*** 
(0.006) 
0.066*** 
(0.003) 
0.016*** 
(0.009) 
Capital stock (ln) 0.124*** 
(0.005) 
0.027*** 
(0.004) 
0.097*** 
(0.004) 
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R-squared 0.399 0.451 0.235 
F-stat (joint significance) 90.20*** 155.37*** 36.09*** 
Number of establishment-year observations 7,418 7,418 7,418 
Number of establishments 2,439 2,439 2,439 
F-statistic for equality of regression coefficients, H0: 
Brussels = Wallonia 
16.10*** 4.76*** 14.00*** 
Conclusion b B > F > W B > (F = W) B > F > W 
Notes: *** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1. Robust standard errors are reported between brackets. Regressions 
also include 11 year dummies. a Value added-wage cost gap = ln(value added per hour) – ln(wage cost per 
hour). b ‘>’ (‘=’) indicates when regression coefficients are (not) statistically different at the 10 percent 
level. B, F and W stand respectively for Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia. 
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